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INTRODUCTION
On June 11, 2001, the United States Supreme Court issued a
controversial opinion in Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,1 holding that gender-based disparities in the federal law
governing parental transmission of citizenship to children born
outside the United States2 do not violate constitutional guarantees of
equal protection.3  Specifically, the Court ruled that the additional

1. 533 U.S. 53, 121 S. Ct. 2053 (2001).
2. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1994) (legislating distinct conditions under which unwed
American mothers and unwed American fathers may transmit their U.S. citizenship
to children born overseas).
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law”).  It is well settled that the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution contains an
equal protection component, analogous to the explicit equal protection guarantees
in the Fourteenth Amendment.  See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)
(explaining that “[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the
same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
239 (1976) (acknowledging “an equal protection component” in the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 636
(1975) (holding that gender-based distinctions in a federal social security statute
violated the “right to equal protection secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment” and specifying that “[t]his Court’s approach to Fifth Amendment
equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment”); see also Respondent’s Brief at 9, Nguyen
(No. 99-2071) (explaining that the issue before the Supreme Court in Nguyen was
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statutory obligations imposed on unwed fathers seeking to transmit
their citizenship to a foreign-born child,4 in contrast to the minimal
obligations required of unwed mothers,5 survive the intermediate
level of equal protection scrutiny required for gender-based
classifications.6  The majority reasoned that differences between men
and women “in relation to the birth process”7 permit Congress to
regulate citizenship transmission “in a manner specific to each
gender.”8
In validating this distinction between mothers and fathers, Nguyen
upheld the deportation of a man who was raised solely by his
American father and who lived in the United States for the majority
of his life.9  Underlying the Court’s rejection of Nguyen’s citizenship
claim was his father’s failure to fulfill the statutory conditions

whether § 1409 violated “the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment”).
4. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (requiring that an unwed American father, seeking to
transmit his citizenship to a child born abroad, establish a blood relationship to the
child by clear and convincing evidence; be a United States citizen at the time of the
child’s birth; agree in writing to provide financial support until the child reaches age
eighteen; legalize his paternity through one of three provided methods:
legitimation under the law of the child’s residence or domicile, acknowledgment of
paternity in writing and under oath, or adjudication of paternity by a competent
court; and further requiring that these conditions be fulfilled before the child turns
eighteen); see also id. (incorporating, by reference, 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g), which
establishes a five-year residency requirement for an American parent seeking to
transmit American citizenship to a foreign-born child, when the child’s other parent
is an alien).  Although the language of § 1401(g) does not distinguish between
mothers and fathers, § 1409(c) exempts unwed mothers from this five-year residency
requirement, rendering the provision applicable exclusively to unwed fathers.  See id.
§ 1409(c) (requiring unwed mothers to have lived in the United States for at least
one year).
5. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (legislating that irrespective of the requirements in
§ 1409(a), a child born abroad and out of wedlock after December 23, 1952 acquires
his mother’s American citizenship, if the mother is a U.S. citizen at the time of birth,
and if the mother previously had been present in the United States for at least one
year).
6. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2064 (requiring gender-based classifications to have
an “exceedingly persuasive justification” (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 530 (1996))); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (explaining that
gender-based classifications “must serve important governmental objectives” and
must be “substantially related to the achievement of those objectives”); cf. Miss. Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-28 (1982) (explaining that “[i]n limited
circumstances, a gender-based classification favoring one sex can be justified if it
intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is disproportionately
burdened”).
7. Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2066; see also id. at 2061 (finding that a citizen mother of
a child conceived overseas has an opportunity for a meaningful parent-child
relationship, which “inheres in the very event of birth,” whereas “it is not always
certain that a father will know that a child was conceived, nor is it always clear that
even the mother will be sure of the father’s identity”).
8. Id. at 2066.
9. See infra notes 61, 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing Nguyen’s
childhood and upbringing).
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mandated for unwed paternal citizenship transmissions.10  The
Court’s decision clarifies that Nguyen would be a U.S. citizen and not
awaiting deportation if his mother, who abandoned him during
infancy, had been an American.11
Four justices dissented in light of this inconsistency. Their dissent
received broad support from scholars and legal practitioners, who
had expected that the Court’s recent jurisprudence,12 as well as
decisions in two circuit courts of appeals,13 would lead to a holding
that the statute under which Nguyen was deported, 8 U.S.C. § 1409,
was unconstitutional.14  In particular, the dissenting Justices and

10. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2057 (discussing Nguyen’s father’s failure to comply
with statutory requirements for paternal transmission of citizenship to children born
abroad and out of wedlock).
11. See id. at 2059 (reciting the statutory provisions for maternal citizenship
transmission, which require that an unwed American mother have “the nationality of
the United States at the time of” her child’s birth and have been “physically present
in the United States . . . for a continuous period of one year prior” to the birth); see
also 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c) (codifying citizenship transmission requirements for unwed
mothers).
12. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 424 (1998) (adjudicating a constitutional
challenge to § 1409, but failing to render a clear decision on the constitutional issue
because of other factors).  Although Miller did not strike down § 1409(a), five Justices
indicated that they perceived an equal protection problem.  Two of these Justices,
however, did not reach the constitutional issue because they found that the
petitioner lacked standing.  See id. at 444-53 (O’Connor and Kennedy, JJ.,
concurring) (explaining that § 1409 “passes rational scrutiny,” but disagreeing with
Justice Stevens’ finding that § 1409(a) “withstands heightened scrutiny”).  Justice
O’Connor added that “[i]t is unlikely . . . that any gender classification[s] based on
stereotypes can survive heightened scrutiny.”  Id. at 451-52; see also id. at 460
(Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (finding that “§ 1409 classifies
unconstitutionally on the basis of gender”).  See generally, Cornelia T. L. Pillard & T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power:    Judicial and Executive Decision
Making in Miller v. Albright, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1998) (criticizing the Miller
decision and suggesting its potential consequences); Katharine B. Silbaugh, Miller v.
Albright:    Problems of Constitutionalization in Family Law, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1139 (1999)
(analyzing Miller from the perspective of family law); Kristin Collins, Note, When
Fathers’ Rights Are Mothers’ Duties:    The Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright,
109 YALE L.J. 1669 (2000) (analyzing the Miller decision in a broader, historical
context); Richard G. Wood, Note, When a Majority Loses on the Merits:    Miller v.
Albright and the Problem of Splintered Judgments, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 816, 823-42
(1998) (analyzing the ramifications of the varied opinions rendered in Miller).
13. See United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d 1121, 1122 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding gender-based provisions in § 1409 unconstitutional), vacated by United
States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 121 S. Ct. 2518 (2001); Lake v. Reno, 226 F.3d 141, 150
(2d Cir. 2000) (same), vacated by Ashcroft v. Lake, 121 S. Ct. 2518 (2001).
14. See David E. Rovella, Circuit Cases Spell Trouble for INS Laws:  Equal Protection
Issue May Lead to a Judicial Backlash, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 30, 2000, at A1 (noting that
“many experts think that the U.S. Supreme Court will void [§ 1409(a)] on equal
protection grounds . . . in Nguyen”); Press Release, ACLU, Supreme Court
Citizenship Decision Oks Gender Discrimination, ACLU Says (June 11, 2001), at
http://www.aclu.org/news/2001/n061101c [hereinafter ACLU Press Release]
(characterizing the Nguyen decision as a “backwards step in the Court’s effort to
guarantee constitutional equality for men and women”); cf. Citizenship and Paternity,
WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2001, at A20 [hereinafter Citizenship and Paternity] (arguing,
before the Supreme Court ruled on Nguyen, that the government’s arguments “don’t
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others opposed to the majority opinion criticized the majority’s
failure to apply heightened scrutiny appropriately.15
Heightened scrutiny requires that a gender-based statutory
classification serve “important governmental objectives,” and that the
discriminatory means employed by the government be “substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives.”16  In spite of such
requirements, the majority opinion misconstrued one of the interests
that the government asserted was served by § 140917 and failed
entirely to mention the government’s other asserted interest.18
In recognition of these dilemmas, this Comment argues that the
Supreme Court’s judgment in Nguyen was flawed because it failed to
evaluate either of the government’s asserted interests precisely.  This
Comment further contends that in so failing, the Court impeded its
own ability to evaluate the substantiality of the relationship between

quite cut it”); Michael Dorf, Sex Discrimination at our Borders? The Supreme Court’s
Nguyen Case—Parts I & II, FindLaw’s Writ—Legal Commentary at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20010110.html (last visited June 12, 2001)
(suggesting that the government’s argument might not convince the Supreme
Court); Joanne Mariner, Citizen Dad:    An International Perspective on the Supreme
Court’s Nguyen Case, FindLaw’s Writ—Legal Commentary, 4, at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/mariner/20010111.html (last visited June 12, 2001)
(arguing that the Supreme Court “should strike down the provision challenged in
Nguyen,” and predicting the international ramifications of a decision upholding the
statute).
15. See, e.g., Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2069 (O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
JJ., dissenting) (“Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the fit between the means
and the ends of § 1409(a)(4) is far too attenuated for the provision to survive
heightened scrutiny.”); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996)
(explaining that “sex classifications may be used to compensate women” for
economic disadvantage, but not “to create or perpetuate” inequality between men
and women); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 209 (1976) (suggesting that laws based on
“statistically measured but loose-fitting generalities concerning . . . tendencies of
aggregate groups” such as men and women, are not likely to satisfy the heightened
scrutiny standard); cf. ACLU Press Release, supra note 14 (warning of the
consequences Nguyen poses for the long-standing efforts to achieve constitutionally-
protected gender equality).
16. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)).
17. Compare Respondent’s Brief at 11, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (asserting the
government’s interest in ensuring that foreign-born children “[a]ttain a sufficiently
recognized or formal relationship” with their American parent), with Nguyen, 121 S.
Ct. at 2061 (referring to the government’s interest in ensuring that foreign-born
children have an “opportunity or potential to develop” a relationship with their
American parent).  See also id. at 2072 (O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the majority’s focus on “‘opportunity’ rather than
reality . . . presumably improves the chances of a sufficient means-end fit,” but
arguing that the majority’s interpretation also “dilutes significantly the weight of the
interest”).
18. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2076 (O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting) (criticizing the “majority’s failure even to address the INS’ second
asserted rationale:    that § 1409 prevents certain children from being stateless”); see
also Respondent’s Brief at 11, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (asserting as one of two
government interests served by § 1409, “preventing . . . children from being
stateless”).
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either government objective and the gender-based classifications
§ 1409 creates to achieve them.  Finally, this Comment asserts that
§ 1409 is not substantially related to either government objective.
Indeed, as Nguyen demonstrates, § 1409’s provisions may be
self-defeating in certain situations apparently not contemplated by
the government or a majority of the Court.19
Part I describes § 1409 and discusses Nguyen in the context of
recent Supreme Court and circuit court jurisprudence.  Part II
examines the Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis in Nguyen,
focusing in particular on the government’s two asserted interests of
ensuring a verifiable parent-child relationship and preventing
children from being born without citizenship in any state.20  Part II
argues that the Supreme Court erred in evaluating the importance of
both asserted government interests by misconstruing one interest and
ignoring the other.  Part II also contends that the Court’s flawed
evaluation of the two asserted interests inhibited its proper scrutiny of
the relationship between the interests and the means by which the
statute ostensibly achieves them.  Part II finally argues that § 1409’s
discriminatory provisions are not substantially related to the
realization of either of the government’s proffered objectives.  Part II
concludes by discussing the national and international ramifications
of both § 1409 and the Supreme Court’s preservation of its
discriminatory provisions in Nguyen.  Lastly, Part III proposes an
amendment to § 1409, which provides a non-discriminatory
framework through which the government’s dual objectives of

19. See Citizenship and Paternity, supra note 14, at A20 (pointing out the irony of
§ 1409, as illustrated in the case of Nguyen’s father, Joseph Boulais, who complied
with the spirit of the statute by raising and supporting his son, but nevertheless was
prevented from transmitting his citizenship because of his failure to legalize his
actions—an obligation he would not have faced as a woman); Supreme Court Upholds
Gender-Based Law, TODAY’S NEWS (June 11, 2000), at http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-
bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/06-11-2001 [hereinafter Supreme
Court Upholds Gender-Based Law] (addressing § 1409’s contrary result in Nguyen
because “[a]lthough he offered a family, home and full financial support to his son
throughout childhood,” Nguyen’s father, Joseph Boulais, did not legitimate his
actions under the law); see also Amicus Brief of Equality Now and Others in Support
of Petitioners at 11, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) [hereinafter Brief of Equality Now] (citing
concern by the United Nations Human Rights Committee about the potential
consequences of stateless children in countries whose laws differentiate between
maternal and paternal transmission of citizenship); see also Mariner, supra note 14, at
3-4 (noting that laws in some Middle Eastern, Asian, and African countries require
children to derive their citizenship from their father, and concluding that, in such
countries, a child born to an unmarried American man and a woman who was a
national of that country would be subject to a high risk of statelessness). But see
Pillard & Aleinikoff, supra note 12, at 45 (generalizing that “virtually everywhere
today birth to a mother in her home country transmits citizenship”).
20. See Respondent’s Brief at 11, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (outlining the
government’s two proffered interests).
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ensuring verifiable parent-child relationships and preventing
statelessness can be achieved.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Source of the Controversy:  8 U.S.C. § 1409
Title 8, § 1409 of the U.S. Code regulates the jus sanguinis,21 or
blood-based, transmission of U.S. citizenship to persons born outside
of the United States to unwed parents, only one of whom is
American.22  Congressional treatment of children born abroad to
American parents has evolved over the past century.23  Currently,

21. See, e.g., Durward V. Sandifer, A Comparative Study of Laws Relating to
Nationality at Birth and to Loss of Nationality, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 248, 249-59 (1935)
(defining and contrasting the citizenship laws of jus soli and jus sanguinis
jurisdictions). The term jus soli applies to jurisdictions, such as the United States,
where citizenship of a state is conferred upon persons born in that state.  Id. at 252.
In contrast, jus sanguinis applies to jurisdictions in which one’s nationality is based on
blood, which means that one’s citizenship is determined by that of his/her parents.
Id. at 256.
22. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1994) (regulating parental transmission of U.S.
citizenship to children born abroad when the parents are unmarried and only of
them one is American).
23. See, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 460-68 (1998) (Ginsburg, Souter and
Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (cataloguing a history of U.S. legislation regulating the
transmission of citizenship by an American parent to a child born overseas from the
first statute, enacted in 1790, to the most recent, amended in 1986); Collins, supra
note 12, at 1680-99 (presenting a detailed history of § 1409).  In Miller, Justice
Ginsburg explained that the earliest statutes regulating parental transmission of
American citizenship to a child born overseas discriminated in favor of fathers.  See
Miller, 523 U.S. at 461 (noting that prior to 1934, U.S. legislation granted citizenship
to children born overseas only when the father was an American citizen).  But see
Collins, supra note 12, at 1680-81, 1708 n.56 (noting that case law reveals that the
paternal statutory right to transmit citizenship did not, in most circumstances,
extend to unwed fathers; rather, from “at least the early twentieth century, American
women could transmit citizenship to nonmarital children born abroad much more
readily than could American men”).  Not until the Act of May 24, 1934, codified at
48 Stat. 797, were both fathers and mothers able to transmit their American
citizenship to a child born abroad.  See, e.g., 7 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE, § 93.04[2][d][iii] (Release No. 95, December 2001)
(explaining that the Act of May 24, 1934 extended to mothers the right to transmit
American citizenship to foreign-born children).  In 1940, Congress passed the first
legislation specifically addressing the nationality status of children born out of
wedlock. See id. § 93.04[2][b] (explaining that the Nationality Act of 1940 was the
first statute to adopt specific provisions regulating the citizenship status of children
born out of wedlock).  The Nationality Act of 1940 created limitations on the
paternal transmission of American citizenship to children born out of wedlock.  See
id. § 93.04[2][b]-[c] (explaining that the Nationality Act of 1940 permitted an
unwed father to transmit his American citizenship to a foreign-born child only when
his paternity was established during the child’s minority, through legitimation or
court adjudication).  In 1986, Congress further conditioned an unwed father’s ability
to transmit his American citizenship to a foreign-born child, demanding, in addition
to the aforementioned prerequisites, the four requirements codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409(a).  Id. § 93.04 [2][d][vi]; see supra note 4 (listing the current requirements
for paternal citizenship transmission, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (1994)).
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§ 1409 enumerates four requirements that an unwed American
father, seeking to transmit his citizenship to a foreign-born child,
must fulfill.  First, he must establish his blood relationship to the
child by “clear and convincing evidence.”24  Second, he must be a U.S.
citizen at the time of the child’s birth.25  Third, he must agree in
writing to support the child financially throughout his or her
childhood.26 Fourth, before the child reaches age eighteen, an unwed
American father must legally legitimate his paternity by
acknowledging his paternity under oath or establishing his paternity
by “adjudication of a competent court.”27  In addition to these express
conditions, § 1409(a) incorporates the residency requirements
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g), thus implicitly requiring unwed
fathers to have lived in the United States for at least five years prior to
the child’s birth.28
By contrast, a similarly situated unwed American mother can
transmit citizenship to a foreign born child by fulfilling only two
conditions:  she must be a U.S. citizen at the time of her child’s birth
and must have been physically present in the United States for a
continuous one year period prior to the birth.29
The disparity between the requirements for fathers and those for
mothers has generated a chain of constitutional challenges to
§ 1409,30 resulting most recently in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Nguyen.

24. Id. § 1409(a)(1).
25. Id. § 1409(a)(2).
26. Id. § 1409(a)(3).
27. Id. § 1409(a)(4).
28. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (1994) (imposing a five-year residency requirement for
American parents seeking to transmit their citizenship to a foreign-born child, when
the child’s other parent is an alien).  Although § 1401(g) does not distinguish
between mothers and fathers, § 1409(c) expressly reduces the residency requirement
for unwed mothers to one year.  See id. § 1409(c) (requiring unwed mothers, seeking
to transmit American citizenship to foreign-born children, to have lived in the
United States for at least one year prior to the birth of the child).
29. Id. § 1409(c); see also REVISION OF IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAWS, S. Rep.
No. 1137, at 4, 39 (1952) (explaining that § 1409(c)’s establishment of a child’s
nationality “as that of the mother regardless of legitimation or establishment of
paternity is new.  It insures that the child shall have a nationality at birth.”).
30. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 424 (1998) (ruling on a constitutional
challenge to § 1409 but prevented by a standing issue from rendering a clear
decision on the statute’s constitutionality); United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 189
F.3d 1121, 1122 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding a constitutional challenge to § 1409);
Lake v. Reno, 226 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 2000) (same); Nguyen v. INS, 208 F.3d 528,
533 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to § 1409).
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B. The Controversy Surrounding § 1409
Prior to Nguyen, federal jurisprudence regarding the
constitutionality of § 1409 was vague and inconsistent.31  The Court’s
fractured 1998 decision in Miller v. Albright generated a sequence of
unsuccessful attempts by several U.S. courts of appeals to envisage
how the high Court would rule on a constitutional challenge to the
statute.32  Rather than clarify the issue, however, the lower courts
fueled the controversy by rendering disparate decisions on similar
legal questions.33
1. Miller v. Albright
Much of the controversy surrounding Nguyen stemmed from the
Supreme Court’s inability to render a clear decision when presented
with similar facts four years earlier.34  In Miller v. Albright, Lorelyn
Penero Miller challenged the constitutionality of § 1409 on behalf of
her American father, claiming that the statute denied him the right
to transmit his citizenship with the same ease with which it permitted
maternal transmissions of citizenship.35  The Court, unable even to
agree as to whether Miller had standing to bring the case, delivered a
splintered opinion.  Four justices ruled against Miller:  two found that
§ 1409 did not violate equal protection mandates,36 and the other two
found that the Court lacked the power to provide the requested
remedy.37  Five justices indicated that Miller’s claims were justifiable:

31. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 424 (ruling on the constitutionality of § 1409 but
hampered by a standing issue from making a clear decision on the equal protection
claim); Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d at 1125-27 (holding § 1409 unconstitutional after
interpreting the various opinions in Miller); Lake, 226 F.3d at 145-48 (same); Nguyen,
208 F.3d at 533-35 (following only the plurality opinion in Miller and finding that
§ 1409 meets constitutional guarantees of equal protection); see also The Last of Gender
Stereotyping, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORT, Jan. 9, 2001, at 3 [hereinafter The Last of
Gender Stereotyping] (describing the inconsistent consequences of attempts by the
circuit courts of appeals to interpret the significance of Miller in regard to the
constitutionality of § 1409), available at LEXIS, Legal Publications Group File.
32. Compare Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d at 1125-27 (interpreting Miller as
indicating that § 1409 is unconstitutional), and Lake, 226 F.3d at 145-49 (same), with
Nguyen, 208 F.3d at 534-36 (reading Miller as upholding the constitutionality of
§ 1409).
33. See supra notes 31-32.
34. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 444-90 (rendering four separate opinions on an equal
protection claim brought by the out-of-wedlock daughter of a Filipina mother and an
American father).
35. Id. at 424.
36. See id. at 440 (Stevens, J., and Rehnquist, C.J.) (holding that “strong
governmental interests justify the additional requirement imposed on children of
citizen fathers” and that “the particular means used in § 1409(a)(4) are well tailored
to serve those interests”).
37. See id. at 452-53 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurring) (stating, “it makes no
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three found the statute unconstitutional,38 and two found that Miller
lacked standing to bring her father’s equal protection claim but
noted in dicta that the statute would not withstand heightened
scrutiny.39  Because the Court ultimately was unable to decide the
issue of whether § 1409 violated constitutional guarantees of equal
protection,40 lower courts were left with little guidance in subsequent
challenges to the statute’s constitutionality.41
2. United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar
In 1999, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered an equal
protection challenge to § 1409 when Mexican-born defendant
Ricardo Ahumada-Aguilar appealed his conviction for illegal re-entry
by an alien with prior felony convictions on the grounds that he had
derivative U.S. citizenship from his American father.42  The Ninth
Circuit evaluated all of the opinions set forth in Miller and
determined that, had the Miller Court been presented with the facts
of Ahumada-Aguilar, a majority would have applied heightened
scrutiny and held § 1409(a)(4), which mandates legitimation of
paternity before the child turns eighteen, unconstitutional.43  The
Ninth Circuit further reasoned that § 1409(a)(3), which requires
unwed fathers to agree in writing to provide financial support, relied

difference whether or not § 1409(a) passes ‘heightened scrutiny’” and concluding
that “[t]he complaint must be dismissed because the Court has no power to provide
the relief requested”).
38. See id. at 472 (Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (finding that
§ 1409’s gender-based distinctions “lack the ‘exceedingly persuasive’ support that the
Constitution requires,” and concluding that the statute violates the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantees of equal protection).
39. See id. at 451-52 (O’Connor and Kennedy, JJ., concurring) (disagreeing with
Justice Stevens’ opinion that the statute withstands heightened scrutiny, and
asserting doubt that any gender classification based on stereotypes could survive such
scrutiny).
40. See Rovella, supra note 14, at A1 (asserting that the Court in Miller was “ready
to rule the gender differential unconstitutional but was hobbled by a standing
issue”).
41. See Respondent’s Brief at 7 n.5, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (comparing the Second
and Ninth Circuits’ interpretations of Miller with that of the Fifth Circuit and
explaining that the former courts of appeals interpreted the varied opinions of Miller
to indicate that where lack of standing did not preclude a judicial decision, “Justices
O’Connor and Kennedy would join Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in finding
Section 1409(a) unconstitutional”); The Last of Gender Stereotyping, supra note 31, at 3
(describing the ambiguous precedent set by Miller and the inconsistent attempts by
the lower courts to interpret its holding regarding the constitutionality of § 1409(a)).
42. See United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d 1121, 1122 (9th Cir. 1999)
(rejecting the classification of petitioner as an “alien” on the basis of his father’s
failure to meet the unconstitutional requirements of § 1409(a), and reversing
petitioner’s conviction).
43. See Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d at 1125-27 (noting that Ahumada-Aguilar did
not present the standing issue that had prevented Justices O’Connor and Kennedy
from applying heightened scrutiny in Miller).
CHLOPAK.PRINTER.DOC 7/26/2002  12:45 PM
2002] GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN U.S. CITIZENSHIP LAW 977
on the “outdated stereotypes”44 that a majority of the Miller Court
indicated were impermissible justifications for gender based
classifications.45  The Ninth Circuit ultimately declared both
provisions unconstitutional.46
3. Lake v. Reno
In September 2000, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was
presented with a similar equal protection challenge to § 1409(a).47  In
Lake v. Reno, the petitioner appealed deportation proceedings on the
same grounds asserted in Ahumada-Aguilar and Miller—that he had
derived U.S. citizenship from his American father, and therefore,
could not be deported.48  In its effort to decide the case, the Second
Circuit undertook a detailed analysis of the various opinions
expressed in Miller.49  Ultimately, the Second Circuit, like the Ninth
Circuit, concluded that the statute was unconstitutional, reasoning
that,  if faced with the facts of Lake, a majority of the Miller Court
would have found § 1409(a) unconstitutional.50
Thus, although the Supreme Court in Miller did not strike down
§ 1409(a), two circuit courts of appeals interpreted a majority of the
Miller Court to indicate that the provisions could not withstand
heightened scrutiny.51

44. Id. at 1126 (citing J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 140-42 (1994)).
45. See Miller, 523 U.S. at 452 (O’Connor and Kennedy, JJ., concurring) (“it is
unlikely . . . that any gender classifications based on stereotypes can survive
heightened scrutiny”); see also id. at 472 (Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer JJ., dissenting)
(agreeing with Justices O’Connor and Kennedy that gender classifications based on
stereotypes are unlikely to survive heightened scrutiny and adding that § 1409’s
“gender-based distinctions lack the ‘exceedingly persuasive’ support that the
Constitution requires”).
46. See Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d at 1122 (holding that §§ 1409(a)(3) and (a)(4)
are unconstitutional, “because a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court [in Miller] has
effectively so declared”).
47. Lake v. Reno, 226 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2000).
48. Id. at 143.
49. See id. at 144-57 (noting that “in the absence of an authoritative majority
opinion from the Supreme Court, we must seek our guidance from the available
expressions of the various views of its members”); id. (citing Tran South Fin. Corp. v.
Bell, 149 F.3d 1292, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that plurality opinions of the
Supreme Court are not binding) and Jacobsen v. United States Postal Serv., 993 F.2d
649, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1993) (analyzing the various opinions of the Supreme Court in
a plurality decision)).
50. See Lake 226 F.3d at 148 (“seven justices in Miller would have applied
heightened scrutiny in these circumstances, and five of the justices would have found
the government’s justification for the statute insufficient to satisfy that standard”).
51. Id. at 148; Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d at 1125-27.
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4. Nguyen v. INS
Despite the consensus between the Ninth and Second Circuit
Courts of Appeals regarding the significance of Miller and the
unconstitutionality of § 1409(a), the Fifth Circuit departed from their
approach in April 2000, when Tuan Anh Nguyen and his father,
Joseph Boulais, challenged the statute.52  Instead of analyzing the
varied opinions expressed by the Supreme Court in Miller, the Fifth
Circuit applied Miller’s plurality holding and rejected Nguyen’s
constitutional challenge.53
Recognizing the inconsistency in the lower courts’ interpretations
of Miller, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Nguyen to decide
ultimately whether the gender-based disparities in § 1409 violate the
Constitution.54
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S FLAWED EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS IN
NGUYEN AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
In reviewing Nguyen, the Supreme Court acknowledged its duty to
apply heightened scrutiny in its evaluation of the  constitutionality of
§ 1409.55  Nevertheless, the Court’s equal protection analysis was
fundamentally flawed in at least two important ways.  First, the Court
modified the specific interest in ensuring parent-child relationships,
which the government claimed was served by § 1409, and thus, failed
to evaluate the precise interest asserted by the government.56
Additionally, the Court failed to address the second interest that the
government asserted was served by the statute, namely, the
prevention of statelessness.57  By erring in its duty to evaluate the

52. See Nguyen v. INS, 208 F.3d 528, 533-35 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the
plurality opinion in Miller found that § 1409 did not violate the equal protection
clause and granting the government’s motion to dismiss the appeal).
53. Id. at 535-36.
54. Nguyen v. INS, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000) (granting certiorari).
55. See Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053, 2059 (reciting the constitutional
requirements for a gender-based classification to withstand heightened scrutiny:
the classification must serve important governmental objectives and the
discriminatory means employed by the classification must be substantially related to
such objectives).
56. Compare Respondent’s Brief at 11, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (asserting the
government’s interest of ensuring that “children who are born abroad out of
wedlock have, during their minority, attained a sufficiently recognized or formal
relationship to their United States citizen parent”) (emphasis added), with Nguyen,
121 S. Ct. at 2061 (citing a weakened interpretation of the government’s interest in
ensuring that “the child and the citizen parent have some demonstrated opportunity or
potential to develop” a parent-child relationship) (emphasis added).
57. See Nguyen 121 S. Ct. at 2076 (O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting) (criticizing “the majority’s failure even to address the INS’ second
asserted rationale:  that § 1409 prevents certain children from being stateless”);
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importance of at least one of the two precise interests that the
government claimed were furthered by § 1409, the Court also
impeded its own ability to evaluate the substantiality of the
relationship between either of the interests and the means by which
the statute sought to realize them.58  Had the Court properly
evaluated the government’s asserted interests and the statute’s
provisions, it would have recognized that neither interest was
substantially related to the statute.59
A. The Supreme Court Upholds § 1409
Free from the legal standing impasse that prevented two justices
from ruling on the merits of Miller,60 Nguyen presented an opportunity
for the Supreme Court to settle the much-controverted issue of
whether § 1409 violates constitutional guarantees of equal protection.
Moreover, in light of Joseph Boulais’ role as the exclusive, biological
parental presence in Nguyen’s life,61 the facts of Nguyen were
particularly well suited for analyzing an equal protection challenge to
§ 1409.
1. The facts of Nguyen
The petitioner, Tuan Anh Nguyen, was born in Saigon, Vietnam, in
1969 to an unmarried American father and Vietnamese mother.62
Shortly after Nguyen’s birth, his mother ended her relationship with
Nguyen’s father, Joseph Boulais, leaving him alone to raise their
child.63  Ultimately, Boulais and his new wife raised Nguyen in Texas,

Respondent’s Brief at 17, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (contending that § 1409 promotes a
second important governmental interest of preventing statelessness).
58. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2059 (acknowledging the Court’s duty to evaluate the
importance of the government’s proffered interests and the substantiality of the
relationship between such interests and the discriminatory means by which the
government-designated classifications enable their achievement); see also id. at 2069
(O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (criticizing the majority
opinion for its flawed application of the heightened scrutiny standard).
59. See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the Court’s obligation to evaluate the
substantiality of the relationship between the government’s asserted interests and the
statute’s provisions, and criticizing the Court’s analysis for failing to recognize that
the connection between such interests and the statute is wanting).
60. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 452 (1998) (O’Connor and Kennedy, JJ.,
concurring) (finding that Miller lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of
§ 1409 on her father’s behalf).
61. See Petitioners’ Brief at 4-5, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (explaining that from early
infancy, Nguyen lived with his father, and noting that in 1975, when Nguyen was six
years old, Boulais lost contact with Nguyen’s mother and now does not even know if
she survived the Vietnam War).
62. Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2057.
63. Id.  See also Petitioners’ Brief at 4, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (describing events
leading to Nguyen’s constitutional challenge to § 1409); Nguyen, Tuan, et al. v.
Immigration & Naturalization Service, Opinion Issued, at
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where Nguyen lived from age six as a lawful permanent resident.64
Although Boulais raised and provided financial support to Nguyen
throughout Nguyen’s minority, he did not legally establish his
paternity until 1998, when Nguyen was twenty-eight years old.65
In 1992, at age twenty-two, Nguyen pled guilty to two felony
charges and was sentenced to eight years in prison on each count, to
be served concurrently.66  While Nguyen was serving his sentence, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) initiated deportation
proceedings against him, characterizing him as “an alien who had
been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude,” as well as an
aggravated felony.67
In January 1997, the immigration judge ordered Nguyen deported
to Vietnam.68  Nguyen appealed the order to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA), challenging his deportation on the
grounds that he was an American citizen, having been born to an
American citizen parent.69  When the BIA dismissed the claim,
Nguyen appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and
ultimately to the U.S. Supreme Court,70  alleging the same complaint
adjudicated in Ahumada-Aguilar and Lake—that § 1409’s gender-based
citizenship transmission requirements are unconstitutional.71

http://www.medill.nwu.edu/cases (last visited Feb. 13, 2002) [hereinafter On the
Docket] (noting Nguyen’s abandonment by his mother).
64. Petitioners’ Brief at 4-5, Nguyen (No. 99-2071); On the Docket, supra note 63.
Boulais and his wife raised Nguyen in Vietnam during Nguyen’s infancy.  In 1975,
when Nguyen was six years old, Saigon fell to North Vietnamese communist forces.
At the time, Boulais and his wife were traveling and Nguyen was staying with his
step-grandmother.  Nguyen and his step-grandmother escaped on a refugee ship
bound for the United States and soon met up with Nguyen’s father and step-mother.
Nguyen spent the remainder of his childhood with his family in Texas.  On the Docket,
supra note 63.
65. Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2057; Petitioners’ Brief at 4-5, Nguyen (No. 99-2071); On
the Docket, supra note 63.
66. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2057 (describing Nguyen’s conviction for sexual
assault on a child); Petitioners’ Brief at 6, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (explaining that the
court ordered Nguyen’s sentences to be served concurrently).
67. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2057 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii)
(Supp. IV 1994), which authorize deportation for multiple criminal convictions of
crimes involving moral turpitude and for aggravated felony convictions); see also
Petitioners’ Brief at 6, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (describing the basis for deportation
proceedings in §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii)).
68. Petitioners’ Brief at 6, Nguyen (No. 99-2071).
69. See id. at 7 n.2 (explaining that former 8 U.S.C. § 1105  governed Nguyen’s
petition for review by the BIA, as amended by “transitional” judicial review rules,
which apply to deportation proceedings initiated prior to April 1, 1999).
70. See generally Nguyen v. INS, 208 F.3d 528, 535-36 (5th Cir. 2000) (upholding
the BIA’s finding that Nguyen was deportable and granting the INS’s motion to
dismiss Nguyen’s appeal), aff’d, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
71. See Petitioners’ Brief at 11, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (arguing that § 1409’s
sex-based classifications violate the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal
protection).
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2. Heightened review of § 1409
Although the quality of the Supreme Court’s analysis of § 1409 has
been widely criticized,72 the Court acknowledged its duty to apply
heightened review, as required for gender-based classifications, in its
analysis of Nguyen.73  Heightened review demands that the
government interest served by the discriminatory classification be
“important,” and that the discriminatory means used to realize that
interest be “substantially related” to the interest.74
a. The government’s important interests
The Nguyen Court recongized two important interests, which the
government claimed were furthered by § 1409:  (1) the assurance of
the existence of a biological parent-child relationship and (2) the
assurance that the child and citizen parent have “some demonstrated
opportunity or potential to develop” a relationship that consists of
“the real, everyday ties that provide a connection between child and
citizen parent and, in turn, the United States.”75
In fact, the government did assert two interests, but only one
addressed the relationship between the citizen parent and foreign-

72. See supra note 14 (summarizing various critiques of Nguyen).
73. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2059 (explaining that gender-based classifications
must serve important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means
employed must be substantially related to the achievement of the government’s
objectives, and holding that “§ 1409 satisfies this standard”).  Although much analysis
has focused on the INS’ contention that Congressional plenary power precludes the
Court from applying heightened scrutiny or providing relief, the Supreme Court did
not reach this issue in Nguyen; therefore, it is beyond the scope of this Comment.
For a discussion of the effects of Congressional plenary power on the Supreme
Court’s ability to analyze the constitutionality of citizenship legislation, see, e.g., Fiallo
v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (holding that Congress’ power to deport or exclude
aliens is largely immune from judicial control); Respondent’s Brief at 9, Nguyen
(No. 99-2071) (asserting congressional power over naturalization and citing Fiallo);
Dorf, supra, note 14 (explaining the plenary power doctrine and the INS’ related
argument in Nguyen); Raju Chebium, U.S. Supreme Court to Hear Fathers’ Rights
Challenge to Immigration Law, CNN.COM (Jan. 5, 2001), at http://www.cnn.com/
2001/LAW/01/05/scotus.nguyen.v.INS/ (quoting the government’s argument that
“‘Courts are particularly ill-suited to second-guess Congress’s [sic] judgments about
what classes of persons should be eligible for statutory citizenship’”); see also Rovella,
supra note 14, at A1 (citing the Supreme Court’s Fiallo precedent for deferring to
Congress in immigration issues).  But cf. Hearings on H.R. 6127 Before the House Comm.
on Immigration and Naturalization, 76th Cong. 421 (1940) (statement of Richard W.
Flournoy, Assistant Legal Adviser, State Department) [hereinafter Hearings]
(discussing the historical interpretation of citizenship requirements for a child born
abroad to parents of whom one is an American and the other is not); id.
(enunciating that the requirements are conditions subsequent and that failure to
fulfill them may remove citizenship but cannot not prevent its automatic inherence
upon the child’s birth).
74. Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2064 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533
(1996) and Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
75. Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2060-61.
CHLOPAK.PRINTER.DOC 7/26/2002  12:45 PM
982 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51: 967
born child; the other addressed the prevention of statelessness.76
Moreover, the Court’s description of the government interest in the
parent-child relationship differs from the government’s own
description, which claimed that § 1409 serves to ensure that children
born abroad and out of wedlock “have . . . attained” a sufficient
relationship with their citizen parents.77  Although this description is
similar to the Court’s, there is a substantial distinction between
ensuring that a parent and child “have attained” such a relationship
and ensuring that a parent and child have “some demonstrated
opportunity or potential to develop” such a relationship.78  Indeed, as
Justice O’Connor asserted in her dissent, the Court’s adaptation of
the government’s interest in the parent-child relationship
“presumably improves the chances of a sufficient means-ends fit,” but
also “dilutes significantly the weight of the interest.”79  Whereas the
basis for the government’s asserted interest in the parent-child
relationship is the corresponding link between the child and the
United States, the Court’s diluted “opportunity” for such a bond is so
remote from the ultimate objective that its importance becomes
questionable.80
Moreover, as Justice O’Connor also suggested, assuming, arguendo,
that the assurance of such an opportunity is a valid governmental
objective, neither the government nor the Court explained the
importance of proving the existence of such an opportunity before

76. See Respondent’s Brief at 11, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (asserting two
governmental interests:    first, the assurance that children born abroad and out of
wedlock have achieved a recognized relationship with their U.S. citizen parent, and
second, the prevention of children being born stateless).
77. Compare id. (asserting the government’s interest of ensuring that “children
who are born abroad out of wedlock have, during their minority, attained a
sufficiently recognized or formal relationship to their United States citizen parent”)
(emphasis added), with Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2061 (citing the government’s interest in
ensuring that “the child and the citizen parent have some demonstrated opportunity or
potential to develop” a parent-child relationship) (emphasis added); see also Nguyen,
121 S. Ct. at 2069 (O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting)
(expressing the view that the “disparity between the majority’s defense of the statute
and the INS’ proffered justifications is striking, to say the least”).
78. See supra note 77; see also Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2069-70 (O’Connor, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s alterations to the
government’s asserted interest in light of the Court’s duty to determine whether the
proffered interest is “exceedingly persuasive”).
79. Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2072 (O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting).
80. See id. (O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (doubting
the benefit to be gained from a “‘demonstrated opportunity’ for a relationship,” and
observing the reality that children who have such an “‘opportunity’” for a
relationship with a parent may, nevertheless, fail to develop an actual relationship
with that parent).
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the child reaches age eighteen.81  The facts of Nguyen demonstrate
that, even without legally establishing paternity before the child turns
eighteen, an unwed father may nevertheless develop the “real,
everyday ties” that the Court recognized as the statute’s objective.82  In
this respect, even if the Supreme Court properly found that the
government’s interest in ensuring an opportunity for a substantive
relationship between an unwed father and his foreign-born child is
important, the Court still failed to describe the substantial
connection between that goal and § 1409(a)’s paternally-
discriminatory provisions.83
b. Preventing statelessness
Although the majority does not address it, the government asserted
that § 1409 serves a second important interest—preventing
statelessness.84  Unquestionably, preventing individuals from being
born without citizenship in any country is an important objective.85

81. See id. (O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (questioning
how § 1409’s requirement for obtaining proof of an opportunity for a parent-child
relationship, before the child turns eighteen, substantially furthers the asserted
interest); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(4) (1994) (requiring the legal establishment of
paternity by one of three provided methods before a child reaches age eighteen).
82. See, e.g., Chebium, supra note 73 (noting that § 1409 bars Boulais from
transmitting his citizenship to Nguyen despite supporting the child from infancy);
Citizenship and Paternity, supra note 14, at A20 (arguing that § 1409 rests on a
stereotype that does not justify requiring fathers, such as Boulais, who do raise their
children, to meet burdens not placed on women); Supreme Court Upholds Gender-Based
Law, supra note 19 (noting the denial of Nguyen’s claim of U.S. citizenship because
“although he offered a family, home and full financial support to his son throughout
childhood,” Boulais neglected to legitimate his actions under the law).
83. See, e.g., Nguyen 121 S. Ct. at 2069 (O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
JJ., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for failing to examine sufficiently the
purposes of § 1409 and for accepting an inadequate fit between the means and the
ends of § 1409); see also infra Part II.A.3.a (analyzing the majority’s scrutiny of the
government’s asserted interest in the parent-child relationship).
84. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2076 (O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority for failing “even to address the INS’ second
asserted rationale:  that § 1409 prevents certain children from being stateless”); see
also Respondent’s Brief at 11, 17, Nguyen (99-2071) (explaining the importance of
preventing statelessness, which becomes increasingly likely in situations where
children are born abroad and subjected to the conflicting laws of jus soli and jus
sanguinis jurisdictions); cf. Sandifer, supra note 21, at 258-59 (describing the potential
for statelessness when children are born “illegitimate” in a foreign country).
85. See, e.g., Final Act of the United Nations Conference on the Status of Stateless
Persons, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117, 122-24 (asserting the international goal of
regulating and improving the status of stateless persons); Convention on the
Reduction of the Number of Cases of Statelessness, Sept. 13, 1973, 1081 U.N.T.S.
283, 288 (declaring the international goal of reducing statelessness); cf. Wood, supra
note 12, at 826 n.1 (explaining that even though the United States is not a signatory
to the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons or the Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness, “a plurality of the United States Supreme Court has
concluded that banishment violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and
unusual punishment”) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958)).  But see
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Moreover, § 1409’s recent history reveals that legislators hesitated to
extend the burdensome measures required of unwed fathers to
unwed mothers precisely because of their fear that such conditions
could result in a child being born to an American parent without
citizenship in any country.86  However, in spite of the clear
importance of preventing statelessness, neither the legislative history;
the statute itself; nor the government, arguing on behalf of the INS in
Nguyen, offered evidence of a substantial relationship between the
government’s interest in preventing statelessness and the
discriminatory means employed to do so.87

Respondent’s Brief at 10, Nguyen (99-2071) (conceding that if the government were
forced to amend § 1409 to comply with equal protection requirements, it would
choose to deny unwed mothers their current preference and thus eliminate the
means by which it ostensibly realizes its objective of preventing statelessness); Pillard
& Aleinikoff, supra note 12, at 45 (suggesting that “virtually everywhere today birth to
a mother in her home country transmits citizenship”).
86. See, e.g., REVISION OF IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAWS, S. REP. NO. 82-1137,
at 39 (1952) (explaining that the provisions of § 1409 establishing a child’s
nationality “as that of the mother regardless of legitimation or establishment of
paternity . . . insures that the child shall have a nationality at birth.”).  But see
Hearings, supra note 73, at 431 (explaining that the State Department has “at least
since 1912, uniformly held that an illegitimate child born abroad of an American
mother acquires at birth the nationality of the mother, in the absence of legitimation
or adjudication establishing the paternity of the child”).  The American legal
tradition historically has regarded the mother of a child born out of wedlock as
having “a right to custody and control of such a child as against the putative father,
and [as being] bound to maintain [the child] as its natural guardian.”  Id.  It is
evident, then, that the 1940 and 1952 amendments to § 1409, which enumerate the
varied requirements that an unwed father must fulfill to transmit his American
citizenship to a child born abroad, do not extend to unwed mothers because
legislators feared that placing such conditions on American mothers would hasten
the possibility that children of an American citizen would be born stateless.
Nevertheless, the ease with which U.S. legislators historically have facilitated an
unwed mother’s transmission of her American citizenship to a child born abroad
seems to stem from a conventional view of the mother as responsible and the father
as free from parental responsibility for children born out of wedlock.  See Nguyen, 121
S. Ct. at 2075-6 (O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting)
(interpreting the legislative discussion in Hearings, supra note 73, to indicate that
§ 1409(a)(4) is “paradigmatic of a historic regime that left women with responsibility,
and freed men from responsibility, for nonmarital children”).
87. Indeed, Congress’ considerations apparently ignored the possible, though
perhaps less likely, scenario in which a child is born out of wedlock in a jus sanguinis
jurisdiction, which exclusively permits patrilineal derivative citizenship.  In such a
scenario, the government-imposed burdens on an unwed father’s ability to transmit
his citizenship would amplify, rather than reduce, the likelihood that the child would
be stateless, while the relaxed requirements for an unwed mother would have no
effect.  See, e.g., Mariner, supra note 14 (explaining that some countries, including
Algeria, Kuwait, and Nepal, only recognize citizenship by descent from the father,
and noting that, in those countries, a woman’s inability to transmit her citizenship is
“enshrined in the constitution”); Brief of Equality Now, supra note 19, at 11 (citing
concern by the United Nations Human Rights Committee about the potential
consequences of stateless children in countries whose laws differentiate between
maternal and paternal transmission of citizenship); cf. Gary Endelman & Bill
Coffman, The Changing Face of Equal Protection:    Gender Bias in U.S. Citizenship Law, 95-
03 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 app. (1995) (comparing citizenship laws of various nations);
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3. The substantiality of the relationship between the government’s interests
and its discriminatory means of achieving them
The Supreme Court’s long-standing test for evaluating whether a
statute withstands heightened scrutiny required that the government
establish the existence of a substantial relationship between at least
one of the interests purportedly served by the statute and the
discriminatory means by which the statute sought to realize that
interest.88  Thus, to prevent the Court from striking down § 1409, the
government needed to show a substantial relationship between the
purported goal of ensuring a parental relationship and the additional
limitations imposed solely on unwed American fathers who wish to
transmit their citizenship to children born abroad to non-American
mothers.89  Alternatively, the government needed to show a
substantial relationship between its decision to place these burdens
exclusively on fathers and the purported goal of preventing
statelessness.90
a. Discriminating to ensure a relationship between the citizen parent
and the child born abroad
The government asserted that § 1409’s conditions on the
transmission of American citizenship by an unwed citizen father
ensure that such a parent “has attained the same legal relation to the
child, at some point while the child is still a minor, as both a married

Andy Sundberg, American Citizens Abroad Position Paper on Citizenship (1995), available
at http://www.aca.ch/ppcitiz.htm (noting that each year, ten percent (about 4,000)
of all children born overseas to an American citizen parent do not acquire U.S.
citizenship at birth). But see Pillard & Aleinikoff, supra note 12, at 45 (suggesting that
concerns of statelessness are minimal because “most states permit transmission of the
mother’s citizenship even when the birth occurs outside the mother’s state of
citizenship”).
88. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (explaining that gender-based
classifications must serve “important governmental objectives” and the discriminatory
means employed must be “substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives”); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 530-31 (1996) (requiring
gender-based classifications to have an “exceedingly persuasive justification”).
89. See Respondent’s Brief at 33-34, Nguyen (99-2071) (claiming that § 1409
furthers the government objective of ensuring that an unwed American father
“whose child is to be made a citizen under Section 1409(a) has attained the same
legal relation to the child, at some point while the child is still a minor, as both a
married citizen father and a married citizen mother have at birth”) (emphasis in
original).
90. See id. at 8 (explaining that Congress decided not to extend the requirements
mandated in § 1409(a) to unwed American mothers for fear that their foreign-born
children could become stateless if not granted U.S. citizenship); REVISION OF
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAWS, S. REP. NO. 82-1137, at 39 (1952) (explaining
that the legislative intent of § 1409(c) was to ensure that children born to American
mothers overseas have a nationality at birth).
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citizen father and a married citizen mother have at birth.”91  The
government further explained that such requirements are not
mandated for unwed mothers because mother-child relationships are
“almost invariably established by the fact of maternity.”92  Thus, the
government contended that, to satisfy its objective of ensuring the
attainment of a parent-child relationship between unwed parents and
their foreign-born children, it must insist on tangible proof of
paternal relationships, but can infer the existence of maternal
relationships from the physical act of childbirth.93
This contention fails in both respects.  As the facts of Nguyen
illustrate, § 1409(a)’s conditions on paternal citizenship transmission
may deny citizenship in cases where a legitimate parent-child
relationship exists, thus defeating the very purpose of the provision.94
On the other hand, fathers who do fulfill the statutory conditions
may have nothing more than a genetic, financial, and legal
relationship with their child,95 also defeating the statute’s objective of
ensuring the “real, everyday ties” between the child and citizen
parent.96  Similarly, the statute’s acceptance of the act of birth, alone,

91. Respondent’s Brief at 33-34, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (emphasis in original).
92. Id. at 34. The notion that a maternal relationship is “invariably established”
by the act of giving birth rests on several assumptions about a mother’s behavior and
about the process of recording childbirth.  See, e.g., Nguyen 121 S. Ct. 205, 2070
(2001) (O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (pointing out that
“a mother will not always have formal legal documentation of birth because a birth
certificate may not issue or may subsequently be lost”); Kif Augustine-Adams,
Gendered States:    A Comparative Construction of Citizenship and Nation, 41 VA. J. INT’L L.
93, 107-08 (2000) (arguing that “the degree to which hospital records and birth
certificates ‘typically establish’ the blood relationship between a mother and a child
is culturally dependent and may not be as reliable for establishing the required
blood relationship” as Congress and the Court suggest; and also citing “recent
discoveries of baby-switching at hospitals” as evidence that “the blood relationship
between a mother and a specific child is not immediately and clearly obvious at other
moments even shortly after birth”); Pillard & Aleinikoff, supra note 12, at 20
(suggesting that an unmarried woman might abandon her child, thus negating the
assumption that giving birth should equate with the establishment of a mother-child
relationship); id. at 7 n.100  (citing a UNICEF study, which found that one-third of
all births abroad occur without birth certificates, thus undermining the assumption
that proof of maternity always results from childbirth).
93. Respondent’s Brief at 33-34, Nguyen (No. 99-2071).
94. See supra notes 61, 63-64, 82 and accompanying text (discussing the enduring
parental relationship between Boulais and Nguyen in spite of Boulais’ failure to
legitimate their ties on paper or in court).
95. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (1994) (conferring American citizenship on children
born overseas and out of wedlock when their American citizen fathers establish a
biological and legal paternal relationship, agree in writing to support the child
financially until age eighteen, and fulfill these obligations before the child turns
eighteen).
96. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2061 (characterizing the government’s interest in the
parent-child relationship as seeking to ensure the opportunity for the development
of “the real, everyday ties that provide a connection between child and citizen parent
and, in turn, the United States”); Respondent’s Brief at 33-34, Nguyen (No. 99-2071)
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as sufficient evidence of a maternal relationship presumes a
substantive parental relationship even in cases where such a
relationship is absent, such as when mothers ultimately abandon their
children.97
By neglecting to acknowledge legitimate relationships in some
circumstances, while baselessly presuming the existence of such
relationships in others, § 1409 fails to substantially promote the
government’s goal of ensuring the attainment of genuine
parent-child relationships.  Instead, the statute appears to rely on,
and functions to endorse, generalizations regarding the traditional
parenting roles of mothers and fathers.98  Moreover, even if, in
practice, unwed mothers more frequently maintain parental
relationships with their children than do unwed fathers, that
tendency does not justify disparate legal treatment of unwed fathers
and mothers.99  As Justice O’Connor indicated, “overbroad sex-based

(citing the government interest in ensuring that unwed fathers have attained a
relationship with their foreign-born children, during youth, similar to the
relationship between married citizen parents and their children at birth).
97. See supra note 92 (discussing various circumstances, including abandonment,
in which childbirth does not result in an actual relationship between a mother and
her child).
98. See Respondent’s Brief at 9, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (“It remains the case that
an unwed father typically will have no legally recognized parental rights or
responsibilities toward his child, and will not be similarly situated to an unwed
mother . . . unless he takes steps to formalize the paternal relationship.”); see also, e.g.,
Chebium, supra note 73, at 2 (citing NOW Legal Defense’s characterization that
§ 1409 relies on “outdated stereotypes concerning men’s and women’s parenting
roles” and noting that Nguyen illustrates the inaccuracy of such generalizations in its
depiction of a mother who abandoned her child and a father who cared for him
from infancy); Augustine-Adams, supra note 92, at 98 (asserting that “it is not
biological difference itself but the social meaning ascribed to biology that provides
the basis for differentially regulating the ability of men and women to transmit
citizenship to their children”); Citizenship and Paternity, supra note 14, at A20
(suggesting that even if the government’s generalizations about men’s and women’s
parental roles are true “on average,” such truth does not justify requiring those
fathers who do raise their children to meet unparalleled, gender-specific burdens);
Catharine MacKinnon, Can Fatherhood be Optional?, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2001, at 15A
(asserting that the Court’s “distinction on biological grounds entrenches unequal
social assumptions into equality law—promoting women’s disadvantage even as it
favors them”); cf. Pillard & Aleinikoff, supra note 12, at 18-19 (analyzing the Miller
decision in which the government invoked the same interests as justification for
§ 1409, and criticizing Justice Stevens’ reliance on sex-based generalizations of what
“typically,” “normally,” or “often” is the scenario for women and men in regards to
out-of-wedlock births); Collins, supra note 12, at 1672-73 (arguing that the history of
the transmission of American citizenship illustrates that “[t]he allocation of parental
rights is always correlated with the allocation of parental responsibility.  This basic
legal truism, and its numerous implications for citizenship law, suggests that the
principal gender injustice caused by § 1409 is . . . its creation and perpetuation of a
legal regime in which mothers assume full responsibility for foreign-born nonmarital
children.”) (emphasis added).
99. Cf. Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2071 (“facially neutral laws that have a disparate
impact are a different animal for purposes of constitutional analysis than laws that
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generalizations are impermissible even when they enjoy empirical
support.”100
Although the government insisted that § 1409 does not rely on
gender-based stereotypes,101 it is interesting to reconsider the statute
from a different perspective.  If the Court had viewed the
requirements of § 1409(a) as a means to enable unwed men seeking
to avoid the burdens of paternity, while viewing the absence of such
requirements for women in § 1409(c) as a means of obliging women
to accept the burdens of maternity, perhaps its application of
heightened scrutiny would have yielded a distinct majority opinion.102
Indeed, upholding § 1409’s de facto imposition of the legal, social,
and economic burdens of parenthood on women exclusively would
contradict the Supreme Court’s own assertion in United States v.
Virginia, that “sex classifications . . . may not be used, as they once
were . . . to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic
inferiority of women.”103
b. Discriminating to prevent statelessness
The government offered a distinct justification for its use of
gender-based classifications to prevent statelessness.104  In support of
its goal of ensuring a parent-child relationship, the government

specifically provide for disparate treatment.  We have long held that the differential
impact of a facially neutral law does not trigger heightened scrutiny.”) (citing
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
100. Id. at 2067 (O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) (citing
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 (1994); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
199 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975)).
101. See Respondent’s Brief at 34, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (rejecting the charge that
the basis for treating unwed fathers distinctly from unwed mothers is grounded in a
stereotype about each gender’s relative roles and capacities as parents).
102. See Silbaugh, supra note 12, at 1159 (“Why deny mothers the privilege of
escape conferred on fathers?”); Collins, supra note 12, at 1673-74 n.21 (suggesting
that the distinctions between maternal and paternal rights as provided in § 1409 are
a function of “common-law default rules that . . . allocate full, legal responsibility for
nonmarital children to mothers, while fathers’ prerogatives and autonomy are given
great deference”); id. (arguing that equal protection analysis of § 1409 in terms of
parental rights “lends itself to a kind of circularity:    Because an unwed mother has
superior legal responsibilities, she automatically receives superior parental rights.
The default allocation of parental responsibility to unwed mothers, common to so
many statutes, escapes equal protection scrutiny.”); MacKinnon, supra note 98, at A15
(contending that the majority opinion “assumed that motherhood is passive,
automatic and natural while fatherhood is active, voluntary and legal.  To be a
mother, you just have to be there; to be a father, you have to do things.”).
103. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996) (citing Goesaert v.
Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948)).
104. See Respondent’s Brief at 8, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (explaining that Congress
feared foreign-born children of unwed American mothers could become stateless if
they were not granted United States citizenship and accordingly addressed the fear
by defining a “class of citizen mothers whose foreign-born children are statutory
citizens at birth”).
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essentially argued that the conditions enumerated in § 1409(a) were
crucial only for fathers—implying that the conditions constituted
burdens above and beyond the standard regulations which are
applied to unwed mothers and married mothers and fathers.105
Regarding the prevention of statelessness, the government insisted
that unwed mothers not only should be exempt from these additional
burdens imposed upon unwed fathers, but should be granted the
right to transmit citizenship almost unconditionally to children born
abroad.106
Section 1409(c)’s exemption for women from the burdensome
conditions imposed upon unwed American men may indeed prevent
some children from being born without citizenship in any country, as
unwed American women are able to transmit their citizenship to
foreign-born children with ease.107  However, the statute itself thwarts
this goal by preventing men from transmitting their American
citizenship with similar ease.108  Specifically, § 1409(a)’s burdensome
conditions create the possibility of statelessness for children born to
unwed American fathers and non-American mothers in countries that
prohibit women from transmitting citizenship.109  Thus, when
analyzed in its entirety, § 1409 not only fails to prevent statelessness,
but may actually contribute to the problem in certain
circumstances.110

105. See id. at 8-10 (explaining that Congress made “a legislative judgment that
children who have no formal relationship with their United States citizen father are
less likely to be raised as Americans,” that an unwed father “typically will have no
legally recognized parental rights or responsibilities toward his child, and will not be
similarly situated to an unwed mother or a married father, unless he takes steps to
formalize the paternal relationship,” and accordingly “adopted an additional
requirement that the unwed father put himself in the same legal position as a
married father, by legitimating the child or obtaining an adjudication of paternity”)
(emphasis added).
106. See id. at 8 (explaining Congress’ decision not to extend the requirements
mandated in § 1409(a) to unwed American mothers for fear that their foreign-born
children could become stateless if women were held to such rigorous requirements).
107. Cf. REVISION OF IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAWS, S. REP. NO. 82-1137, at
39 (1952) (noting that the legislative intent behind § 1409(c) was to ensure that
foreign-born children of unwed American mothers have a nationality at birth).
108. See infra notes 122-123 and accompanying text (describing situations in which
§ 1409(a)’s conditions on citizen transmission by unwed American fathers may cause
children to be born stateless).
109. See infra note 122 (listing countries that prohibit maternal citizenship
transmission).
110. See Brief of Equality Now, supra note 19, at 12 n.8, Nguyen (No. 99-2071)
(suggesting that § 1409, when operating in conjunction with foreign laws that
prohibit maternal citizenship transmission, may effect the statelessness of a child
born to an American parent).
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c. The constitutional incompatibility of §§ 1409(a) and (c)
The underlying problem with § 1409 is that its goals of ensuring a
parent-child relationship, on the one hand, and preventing
statelessness, on the other, are constitutionally and practically
incompatible.  Had the Court declared § 1409 unconstitutional,
Congress, in order to satisfy constitutional requirements of equal
protection, ultimately would have been forced to modify the statute
at the expense of one of its goals.111  Eliminating the conditions on
paternal citizenship transmission, in order to avoid impermissibly
burdening one gender, ostensibly would have sacrificed the goal of
ensuring a parental relationship between unwed fathers and their
foreign-born children.112  Alternatively, attempting to cure the equal
protection problem by extending the burdensome conditions to
maternal citizenship transmission seemingly would have sacrificed
the goal of preventing statelessness.113
The government’s own brief acknowledges this dilemma,
conceding that, if forced to equalize the maternal and paternal
regulations, the “appropriate course would be to deny unwed
mothers their current preference.”114  By admitting its ultimate
willingness to sacrifice the means by which § 1409 may prevent
statelessness, the government casts doubt on the value of that goal
and ultimately on the substantiality of the relationship between
preventing statelessness and creating gender-based categories to do
so.
B. Ramifications of the Supreme Court’s Ruling in Nguyen
In spite of the Court’s attempt to settle the controversy
surrounding § 1409, the Nguyen decision already has incited extensive
criticism from various members of the legal community, both for the
immediate ramifications for those individuals directly affected by the

111. See Respondent’s Brief at 10, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (explaining that “the
remedial question in this case would be whether the terms applicable to unwed
fathers and unwed mothers should be equalized by making unwed fathers eligible for
the same preference as unwed mothers . . . or whether the Court should strike down
Section 1409(a) and (c) entirely or, alternatively, subject unwed citizen mothers to
the same requirements as unwed citizen fathers under Section 1409(a)”).
112. See id. at 33 (explaining that conditions imposed by § 1409(a) upon unwed
fathers serve “to ensure than an unwed citizen father whose child is to be made a
citizen under Section 1409(a) has attained the same legal relation to the child . . . as
both a married citizen father and a married citizen mother have at birth . . . or as an
unwed citizen mother has at birth”) (emphasis in original).
113. See id.  (contending that the government’s interest in preventing statelessness
is served by exempting unwed American mothers from the requirements mandated
in § 1409(a)).
114. Id. at 10.
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decision, and for the consequences to long-standing efforts to
promote gender equality and international human rights.
1. Direct consequences for Nguyen and others
The immediate consequences of Nguyen are severe for those
individuals whose claims of American citizenship hinge on their
fathers’ ability to transmit their citizenship.  Tuan Anh Nguyen,
despite having served his full sentence in an American prison, and
having spent the majority of his life with his American family in
Texas, was ordered deported to Vietnam.115  Ricardo Ahumada-
Aguilar and Joseph Lake, the petitioners whose constitutional
challenges to § 1409(a) were supported by the Second and Ninth
Circuit Courts of Appeals, also will be denied American citizenship.116
2. Far-reaching national and international consequences
Nguyen’s more profound consequences are the potential effects on
the long-standing efforts to eradicate gender-based disparities in legal
rights and responsibilities.117  By relying on traditional notions of

115. See, e.g., On the Docket, supra note 63 (noting that Nguyen had finished serving
his felony sentence before the Supreme Court rendered its decision); Joanna L.
Grossman, Supreme Court Ruling a Victory for Motherhood and Sexism, CNN.COM (June
20, 2001), at http://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/06/columns/fl.grossman.ins.06.22/
(noting Nguyen’s imminent deportation to Vietnam, and characterizing the country
as one with which Nguyen lacks “any meaningful ties” and to which he is “a complete
stranger”).  But see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 150 L. Ed. 2d. 653
(2001) (holding that the INS may not detain an alien indefinitely when there is no
realistic chance that the alien will be deported because of, inter alia, the absence of a
repatriation agreement between the United States and the country to which the alien
is to be removed); The Last of Gender Stereotyping, supra note 31 (explaining that
Vietnam has no repatriation agreement with the United States and will not receive
Nguyen).  Six months after the final order to deport Nguyen, the United States and
Vietnam still had not negotiated a repatriation agreement.  Telephone Interview
with Nancy A. Falgout, Counsel of Record in Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 121 S. Ct.
2053 (2001) (July 8, 2002).  Thus, to comply with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Zadvydas, the INS released Nguyen from custody.  Id.; see Zadvydas, 121 S. Ct. at 2505
(holding that “an alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined
that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future”).
116. See Ashcroft v. Lake, 121 S. Ct. 2518 (2001) (vacating Lake v. Reno, 226 F.3d
141 (2d Cir. 2000), and remanding the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit for further consideration in light of Nguyen); United States v.
Ahumada-Aguilar, 121 S. Ct. 2518 (2001) (vacating Ahumada-Aguilar, 189 F.3d 1121
(9th Cir. 1999) and remanding the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit for further consideration in light of Nguyen).
117. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 115 (arguing that “[r]omantic ideals about the
uniqueness of motherhood,” which serve as the basis for the gender-based disparities
in § 1409 and for the Court’s decision to uphold the law, “perpetuate the notion that
women, rather than men, should assume responsibility for children”).  Grossman
further asserts that such ideals “also contribute to negative stereotypes that diminish
women as workers, wage earners, and participants in public life . . . and
perpetuate . . . a less than ideal concept of fatherhood, in which it is ‘natural’ for
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maternal duties,118 the Court’s protection of § 1409 as it stands
enables irresponsible fathers, disables responsible fathers, and
consigns women to the role of sole parent, regardless of whether
women choose this role.119
Nguyen also threatens international efforts to prevent
statelessness.120  Ironically, despite the government’s ostensible goal of
supporting such efforts,121 § 1409 may increase, rather than reduce,
the likelihood that children born in certain countries will be
stateless.122
More broadly, Nguyen stands in conflict with the international
trend to treat men and women equally in most aspects of law,
including the possession and transmission of citizenship.123  In

fathers to shirk responsibility.”  Id.  See also Collins, supra note 12, at 1672-73 (arguing
that § 1409 creates and perpetuates “a legal regime in which mothers assume full
responsibility for foreign-born nonmarital children”) (emphasis added); cf. Editorial,
Fathers Need Equal Protection, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES ONLINE (Jan. 18, 2001), at
http://www.sptimes.com/News/011801/news_pf/Opinion/Fathers_need_equal_pr.
shtml (“If we expect fathers to be as responsible toward their children as mothers,
then our laws should reflect that view”).
118. See generally Collins, supra note 12, at 1672-74, 1682-94 (analyzing the history
of coverture, the common law regime that established the rights and responsibilities
of parents to children according to marital status and gender, and finding that under
coverture, women had exclusive rights and responsibilities regarding children born
out of wedlock).  As a means to protect men from claims on property and status by
illegitimate children, “the law imposed no obligation [on men] to support or care
for their nonmarital children.”  Id.
119. See, e.g., id. at 1699-1706 (describing § 1409’s default allocation of maternal
legal responsibility and its protection of male autonomy by hypothesizing the
scenario of a United States serviceman who fathers a child abroad, and leaves the
mother alone to support herself and the child, while escaping any repercussions for
his irresponsibility); Citizenship and Paternity, supra note 14, at A20 (criticizing
§ 1409’s consequence of burdening fathers who do raise their children); Supreme
Court Upholds Gender-Based Law, supra note 19 (quoting Martha Davis of the NOW
Legal Defense and Education Fund for staing that “the Supreme Court’s decision
protects irresponsible fathers at the expense of Joseph Boulais”).
120. Cf. supra note 85 and accompanying text (describing international efforts to
prevent statelessness).
121. See Respondent’s Brief at 11, Nguyen (No. 99-2071) (describing the
government’s objective of using § 1409 to prevent statelessness).
122. See Mariner, supra note 14, at 4 (citing Algeria, Kuwait, and Nepal as
countries in which women are constitutionally prohibited from transmitting their
citizenship to a child and concluding that a child born in one of the countries to an
American father and a woman citizen of the country “must take his father’s
citizenship, or be stateless”); Brief of Equality Now, supra note 19, at 12 nn.8-9 (citing
Initial Report of States Parties due in 1997:  Kuwait, CCPR/C120/Add.1 (1999), at
300-301, which notes that Kuwaiti law exclusively permits paternal citizenship
transmission, and suggesting that “it is possible that 8 U.S.C. § 1409, operating in
conjunction with laws in other countries that deny women the right to transmit
citizenship, could result in the statelessness of a child born out-of-wedlock and
abroad”).
123. See Brief of Equality Now, supra note 19, at 2-3 (citing Supreme Court
precedent for looking to international legal norms when deciding cases in the
context of immigration law; urging the Court to consider “the growing international
as well as national recognition that . . . distinctions between fathers and mothers are
CHLOPAK.PRINTER.DOC 7/26/2002  12:45 PM
2002] GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN U.S. CITIZENSHIP LAW 993
particular, the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which the
United States signed in 1980, but has yet to ratify, states in its
Preamble, “the role of women in procreation should not be a basis
for discrimination” and “the upbringing of children requires a
sharing of responsibility between men and women.”124
III. RECOMMENDATIONS:  AMENDING THE STATUTE
This Comment seeks to draw attention to the legal dilemmas
inherent in § 1409 and the Supreme Court’s analysis of its
constitutionality.  These dilemmas include the statute’s
discriminatory nature,125 the Court’s failure to scrutinize such
discrimination properly,126 and most fundamentally, the statute’s
inability to promote fully either of its stated objectives.127  Although
stare decisis renders a proper judicial resolution of these dilemmas

incompatible with the equal sharing of parental responsibility and serve to entrench
stereotypes that absolve men of this responsibility”).  The Equality Now Amicus Brief
also cites the United States’ own report to the United Nations Human Rights
Committee, in which the United States reported that “‘[i]t is virtually certain that the
Supreme Court would strike down any significant distinction between men and
women in the enjoyment of the civil and political rights secured by the
[International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], either under the substantive
right involved or as a matter of equal protection.’”  Id. at 7 (citing Initial Reports of
States Parties due in 1993:    United States of America, CCPR/C/81/Add.4 (1994) at
105).  The Brief explains that the United Nations Human Rights Committee has
expressed concern, in the context of potential statelessness of children, about laws
“that treat mothers and fathers differently in the transmission of citizenship to
children.”  See id. at 11.  The Brief further cites the preamble of the United Nations
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), which proclaims that “‘the role of women in procreation should not be a
basis for discrimination but that the upbringing of children requires a sharing of
responsibility between men and women . . .’ and that ‘a change in the traditional role
of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve
full equality between men and women.’”  See id. at 12-13.  The United States has
signed, but has not ratified CEDAW.  See id. at 17.  The Equality Now Brief argues,
however, that the “broad” and “overwhelming” ratification of CEDAW throughout
the world, and its reflection of general principles of customary international law
render it an important legal source, which the Supreme Court should have
considered in Nguyen. See id. at 17-18.  See also MacKinnon, supra note 98, at A15
(recommending that the U.S. Congress should follow the international trend to
modify domestic citizenship requirements that discriminate on the basis of gender to
meet international equality standards).
124. United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, preamble, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14 .
125. See generally supra Part I.A (contrasting § 1409(a)’s burdensome requirements
for citizenship transmission by unwed fathers with § 1409(c)’s simple requirements
for citizenship transmission by unwed mothers).
126. See generally supra Part II.A.2-3 (examining the Supreme Court’s equal
protection analysis in Nguyen).
127. See supra Part II.A.3.a-b (arguing that § 1409’s provisions may defeat the very
objectives that the statute was intended to promote).
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unlikely,128 Congress, by amending the statute, may better address its
objectives and remove the taint of discrimination from the law.
A. Ensuring a Parental Relationship Between Unwed Parents and
Children Born Abroad
As indicated by the government and acknowledged by the Court,
§ 1409’s primary objective is to ensure the existence of authentic
parental relationships as a condition for conferring citizenship to
children born overseas and out of wedlock.129  Nevertheless, the
statute’s current provisions do not fulfill this goal.130  If Congress
sincerely is interested in ensuring a substantive relationship between
unwed parents and their foreign-born children, it should redraft the
statute to impose conditions that actually address such a
relationship.131  Moreover, Congress ought to acknowledge that
childbirth does not necessarily result in a substantive relationship
between mother and child132 and accordingly, should require unwed
mothers to establish the existence of a tangible maternal relationship
with their foreign-born children as well.
A logical solution would be to amend § 1409(a)(1) to require that
“a blood [and substantial parental] relationship between the
[foreign-born child] and the [American citizen parent] is established
by clear and convincing evidence.”133  By expanding this provision to

128. See, e.g., Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (noting
the Court’s reluctance to depart from its own precedent, particularly when “the
legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have
done”).
129. See Respondent’s Brief at 10, Nguyen (99-2071) (explaining that if forced to
choose between § 1409’s relationship-ensuring and statelessness-preventing
provisions, the government would opt to maintain the former); see also Nguyen, 121 S.
Ct. at 2060-61 (citing as the government’s important interests, the assurance of a
biological parent-child relationship and the assurance of a demonstrated opportunity
for a substantive connection between the citizen parent and foreign-born child).
130. See supra Part II.A.3.a-b (contending that § 1409 fails to recognize some
legitimate paternal bonds, as demonstrated by Nguyen, and universally presumes the
existence of maternal bonds by virtue of birth, even where the mother-child
connection does not endure).
131. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1409 (1994) (evaluating a paternal bond between
unwed fathers and foreign-born children by the father’s biological, financial, and
legal connection to the child, and evaluating a maternal bond between unwed
mothers and foreign-born children exclusively by the existence of a biological
connection); see also supra Part II.A.3.a-b (discussing § 1409’s failure to ensure
parent-child relationships in situations where fathers, like Joseph Boulais, enjoy a
genuine bond with their child but fail to make that bond official under the law, and
noting the statute’s wrongful assumption of a parent-child relationship where
mothers give birth to a child, but fail otherwise to maintain a maternal bond).
132. See supra note 92 (discussing circumstances in which childbirth does not
result in an enduring, substantive relationship between mother and child).
133. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(1) (requiring, at present, that “a blood relationship
between the person and the father is established by clear and convincing evidence”).
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require evidence of a substantial relationship and extending the
requirement to mothers as well, the statute would go much further to
ensure the existence of the “real, everyday ties,” which the Court in
Nguyen held to be important.134  Moreover, the statute’s additional
requirements that unwed fathers legitimate their paternity, agree in
writing to provide financial support, and do both before the child
turns eighteen135 would no longer be necessary.  Courts could
consider such factors, among others, in evaluating whether there is
clear and convincing evidence of a substantial parental
relationship.136  In brief, amending § 1409 so that it simply requires
clear and convincing evidence of a biological and substantial parental
relationship between unwed parents and their foreign-born children
would advance both of the Court-interpreted government interests137
and would remove the taint of discrimination from the statute.
B. Preventing Statelessness
Eliminating § 1409’s paternal legitimation and support
requirements, as well as its eighteen-year limitation period, and
replacing these requirements with a broader “clear and convincing
evidence of a substantial parental relationship” standard could also
enhance the statute’s ability to prevent statelessness.138  By allowing
flexibility in the evaluation of what constitutes a substantial parental
relationship, the statute would facilitate citizenship transmission by
fathers like Joseph Boulais, who enjoy meaningful relationships with

The proposed amendment to this statute borrows from family law standards of
evaluating a paternal relationship.  See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
142-43 (1989) (Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (holding that an
unwed father’s biological link and “substantial parent-child relationship” with a child
guarantee that father a constitutional stake in his paternal relationship; elaborating
that a substantial relationship may be evidenced by a demonstrated “full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood” such as participation in the
child’s upbringing) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) and Lehr v.
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983)).
134. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2060-61 (citing the government’s important interest
in ensuring a demonstrated opportunity for a substantive connection between the
citizen parent and foreign-born child).
135. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1409 (a)(3)-(4).
136. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 142-43 (Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
dissenting) (evaluating the substantiality of a parent-child relationship between an
unwed father and his biological child by considering the father’s dedication to the
responsibilities of parenthood, including participation in the child’s upbringing).
137. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2060-61 (inferring the governmental interests of
ensuring a biological parent-child relationship and the demonstrated opportunity for
the development of a genuine, substantive connection between citizen parent and
child).
138. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (identifying the prevention of
statelessness as one of the two purposes of § 1409).
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their foreign-born children, but fail to fulfill the statute’s current
technical requirements.139  Moreover, in instances where such fathers
conceive children with non-American mothers in countries that
prohibit maternal citizenship transmission, the proposed changes to
§ 1409 would prevent statelessness instead of causing it, as the
statute’s current provisions do in such circumstances.140
Conversely, extending the proposed “clear and convincing
evidence of a substantial parental relationship” standard to unwed
mothers might fail to prevent statelessness in situations where unwed
American mothers cannot demonstrate a meaningful relationship
with their foreign-born child.141  However, in light of the Supreme
Court’s apparent willingness to accept childbirth as a strong
indication of the “real, everyday ties” that constitute legitimate
parent-child relationships,142 this consequence seems relatively
minimal.  Moreover, to the extent that the proposed amendment to
§ 1409 would not fully realize the government’s objective of
preventing statelessness, it must be remembered that this flaw already
exists in the current version of the statute.143  Additionally, the
government conceded its ultimate willingness to forego its
statelessness objective altogether.144  The proposed amended version
of § 1409 thus would improve upon the present statute by more
effectively ensuring the existence of parent-child relationships when
conferring citizenship, and by preventing statelessness in most of the
circumstances currently addressed by the statute, as well as in other
circumstances, which the statute currently neglects.145
Finally, beyond the limited context of the statute itself, the United
States also could promote its concern for stateless children
internationally by signing and ratifying one or both of the United

139. See supra notes 61, 63-64, 82 and accompanying text (describing the
substantive relationship between Nguyen and his father).
140. See Brief of Equality Now at 12 n.8-9, Nguyen (99-2071) (noting that § 1409
may cause statelessness of children born to unwed American fathers and
non-American mothers in countries whose laws prohibit maternal citizenship
transmission).
141. See supra note 92 (noting the reality that some mothers do not maintain
enduring relationships with their child after birth).
142. See Nguyen, 121 S. Ct. at 2061 (finding that proof of a maternal relationship is
“inherent in birth itself”).
143. See supra notes 122-123 (explaining how § 1409(a) may function to cause
statelessness).
144. See Respondent’s Brief at 10, Nguyen (99-2071) (admitting the government’s
ultimate willingness to deny unwed mothers “their current preference,” and thus
sacrifice the means by which § 1409 currently functions to prevent statelessness).
145. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (suggesting that the United States
has overlooked § 1409’s facilitation of statelessness among children born to unwed
American fathers and non-American mothers in countries that prohibit women from
transmitting their citizenship).
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Nations conventions addressing statelessness.146
C. Promoting Gender Equality
In addition to highlighting the inadequacies of § 1409’s current
provisions, the legal community can emphasize the statute’s
legislation by default of unequal parental responsibility between
mothers and fathers.147  Whereas the statute facilitates maternal
citizenship transmission to children born abroad and out of wedlock,
rendering mothers automatically responsible for such children, it
impedes paternal citizenship transmission by enabling fathers to
avoid parental responsibility if they so choose.148  Public emphasis on
§ 1409’s imposition of different degrees of parental responsibility on
women and men may generate a better understanding of the statute’s
discriminatory nature and, perhaps, encourage Congress to redraft
the law.149
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, in Nguyen, sought to settle a legal controversy
that had encompassed scholars, legislators, practitioners, and federal
judges.  In holding § 1409 constitutional, the Court attempted to
resolve the complex debate over whether its own standards of equal
protection require federal laws to treat mothers and fathers equally in
their roles as parents.  However, the Court’s superficial application of
its self-formulated heightened scrutiny test has rendered its decision
hollow.  As Justice O’Connor asserted in her dissent:
The Court recites the governing substantive standard for
heightened scrutiny of sex-based classifications . . . but departs
from the guidance of our precedents concerning such
classifications . . . [T]he majority hypothesizes about the interests
served by the statute and fails adequately to inquire into the actual
purposes of § 1409(a)(4).  The Court also does not always explain

146. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (asserting the international goal of
regulating and improving the status of stateless persons); Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness, Aug. 30, 1961, 1081 U.N.T.S. 283 (declaring the
international goal of reducing statelessness).
147. See Collins, supra note 12, at 1706 (urging a reevaluation of the current
application of equal protection analysis to citizenship laws, which purport to legislate
legal rights, but which, by default, also legislates legal responsibilities).
148. See supra notes 117, 119 and accompanying text (discussing the contradictory
consequences of § 1409 for men and women).
149. See Collins, supra note 12, at 1707 (suggesting that an unawareness of § 1409’s
“default rules of parental responsibility” lead both legislatures and courts to
compromise gender equality in an effort to fulfill “ostensibly rational policy
interests”).
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adequately the importance of the interests that it claims to be
served by the provision.  The majority also . . . casually dismisses the
relevance of available sex-neutral alternatives [to § 1409(a)] . . .
[I]n all, the majority opinion represents far less than the rigorous
application of heightened scrutiny that our precedents require.150
In upholding § 1409, the Nguyen Court ignored the statute’s failure
to recognize authentic parental relationships, such as the bond
between Nguyen and his father.  The Nguyen Court also ignored the
statute’s tendency to cause statelessness, rather than prevent it, in
circumstances where a child is born to an unwed American father
and non-American mother in a country that prohibits women from
transmitting their citizenship to their children.  Finally, rather than
upholding the Constitution’s guarantees of equal protection, the
Nguyen decision may serve to legalize long-standing stereotypes of
men’s and women’s parental roles, obliging women to accept
maternity at conception, but enabling men to deny their paternity
indefinitely.

150. Nguyen v. INS, 121 S. Ct. 2053, 2069 (2001) (O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
